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I. Introduction
{1} The scope of copyright protection for case reports and case reporters has been the subject of litigation
since the Supreme Court decided its first copyright case, Wheaton v. Peters,[1] in 1834. Prior to the
development of electronic technologies, the courts established a fairly consistent set of guidelines on which
print publishers could rely. However, the development of electronic research tools raised new questions
which the old guidelines did not address. With the founding of Lexis's online research service, and the later
development of CD-ROM research products, West Publishing Co., the premier publisher of case reports,
found itself in possession of a valuable commodity which previously was of little commercial significance -
the page numbers in its print compilations.
{2} Over the years, through general usage later reinforced by rules adopted in various courts, West's National
Reporter System had become the standard citation reference.[2] Online publishers were forced to cross
reference their electronic versions of court opinions to West's page numbers in order to provide their users
with an acceptable means of referencing case law. This development set off a string of lawsuits, beginning
with West Publishing v. Mead Data Central, Inc.,[3] which focused on the meaning of the originality
requirement in the context of compilations. The scope of the inquiry expanded beyond pagination to include
the copyrightability of West's textual additions and revisions.
{3} The latest episode in this long-running, costly saga was enacted before a three-judge panel of the Second
Circuit, which handed down two companion decisions in Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co.[4]
denying copyright protection to pagination and to several varieties of textual alterations. While the results
reached by the split panel cannot be faulted[5], its analysis of the originality requirement contains several
questionable lines of reasoning. The court's articulation and application of the originality standard in the text
case obscures significant differences between derivative works and compilations, and imports elements of
merger doctrine into the originality determination while denying that merger doctrine is applicable. In the
pagination case, the court's unnecessary attempt to define "copies" and substantial similarity of arrangements
for purposes of infringement in the electronic context may ultimately raise more questions than it resolves.
{4} This comment does not purport to solve all the issues raised herein, but draws attention to flaws which
may become more glaring as time progresses. These cases do not, by any means, represent the last episode in
a litigation series which now rivals "Gunsmoke" for longevity, but the court's oblique analysis may have
shifted the grounds of argument onto legal and technological quicksand. The comment suggests that a more
direct approach to the nature of the works and their originality, or lack thereof, would have produced the
same results while providing a clearer statement of the originality standard as applied to compilations in the
digital environment. 
  
  
II. Background
A. Statutory Framework And Pre-Electronic Precedent
{5} Case reporters may be categorized, for copyright purposes, as either compilations or derivative works,
both of which are included within the subject matter of copyright by 17 U.S.C. ' 103.[6] All collections of
case reports are compilations, but those which contain substantial "value-added materials," such as headnotes
or annotations,[7] may also be considered derivative works as to those elements. The Bender text case further
suggests that individual case reports, and their constituent features, may be characterized as both
compilations and derivative works if the reports contain added facts or other original material.[8] Under ' 103,
the copyright in such works extends only to the original material contributed by the author, but not to the
"preexisting material" employed in the work.[9] Originality and fixation in a tangible medium of expression
are the threshold requirements for copyright.[10]
{6} The "preexisting material" for case reports, the basic texts of the court opinions themselves, are
"government works" exempted from copyright protection. All United States government works, including
case reports from federal courts, are specifically excluded from copyright protection by 17 U.S.C. ' 105. The
Copyright Act contains no specific provision regarding state or local government works, but it is well
established by case law that state judicial opinions belong to the public domain and cannot be copyrighted.
[11]
{7} Almost a century prior to West Publishing, a line of cases specifically concerning case reports established
that compilers could obtain copyright only in original materials which they contributed to the compilation,
such as headnotes, syllabi, indices, and digests, and in their selection and arrangement of the totality. Courts
differed somewhat in their exact cataloging of those features of case reporters which were entitled to
protection, though the variations were of minimal significance until the advent of online research services.
[12]
{8} However, a second line of cases, involving fact situations less directly relevant to case reporters, also
developed in the lower courts early in this century. The "industrious collection" or "sweat-of-the brow" cases
rewarded the mere labor of compilation with little regard to the originality requirement.[13] These two lines
of cases provided the precedential background for West Publishing, the first episode in the modern series of
lawsuits over pagination.
B. West Publishing
{9} In the mid-1980's, Lexis-Nexis, West's only major competitor in case-related research services,
announced its intention to star paginate to the West reporter system in its online case reports.[14] It intended
to indicate not only the initial page number of each report but each page break within the report. West
claimed copyright infringement and won preliminary injunctions first in the District Court for Minnesota,[15]
then in the Eighth Circuit. Both courts rendered full opinions which seemed to determine the merits of the
case.
{10} The Court of Appeals largely eschewed analysis of the 1976 Copyright Act, but focused on prior
judicial precedent, in particular dictum in Callaghan v. Myers[16] which listed pagination among the
protectable elements of compilations. Giving the originality requirement relatively short shrift, the court
concluded that only a minimal showing was required and that West's case arrangement was sufficiently
creative to support copyright protection. Though the court confessed that pagination, in itself, was
insufficiently original to merit copyright, it elaborated a connection between pagination and the protected
arrangement.[17] The court found that Lexis users could, if so inclined, use star pagination as a guide
enabling them to view the complete arrangement of cases in the entire West reporter system as well as the
particular location of each portion of an opinion. Consequently, they would have no need to consult West's
print volumes, and West's market would be harmed. The court did not address the argument that the same
result could be achieved by using the citations to the first page of the report, which West admitted then, and
continues to admit, to be a fair use. It rejected the argument that page numbers are mere facts, not protected
by copyright, citing a case of the industrious collection school.[18]
{11} West Publishing appeared to foreclose the unlicenced use of West's pagination by competitors and
emboldened West, in later litigation, to extend its copyright claims to textual additions and corrections in case
reporters and to section numbering in statutory compilations.[19] However, the Supreme Court's decision in
Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc.,[20] cast serious doubt on the Eighth
Circuit's interpretation of the originality requirement.
C. Feist Publications
{12} In Feist, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of copyright protection for compilations in the context
of a copyright infringement suit between two compilers of telephone directories. Such directories formerly
found protection in those courts endorsing reward for industrious collection.[21] The Feist court stated
unequivocally that "originality is a constitutional requirement."[22] Since facts are not authored, but are
merely discovered, they are part of the public domain. Factual compilations meet the originality standard for
copyright only if the compiler independently makes choices as to selection and arrangement of the facts
which entail a minimal degree of creativity. However, such selections and arrangements receive only "thin
protection" against near-verbatim copying. The court explicitly rejected the "sweat of the brow" cases, which
rewarded the mere labor of fact compilation without a showing of originality.[23] While the originality
standard requires only "some minimal level of creativity" for a compilation to achieve copyright protection,
not all compilations will be sufficiently original to trigger copyright protection. Even where the work is
copyrightable, ' 103 specifically limits its protection to the author's original contributions.[24]
{13} Feist definitively established several guiding principles for protection of compilations: (1) originality is
the touchstone for copyright protection not only under the statute but under the Constitution's Copyright
Clause; (2) the mere labor of collecting data, i.e., "sweat of the brow," does not warrant protection absent
originality in the selection and arrangement of data; (3) compilations receive only "thin" protection even for
original selection and arrangement - the underlying information cannot be copyrighted.[25]
{14} The court's opinion offered some guidelines - the work need not be "novel,"[26] but cannot be
"mechanical" or "routine" or "entirely typical"[27] - and suggested that the vast majority of compilations will
pass the originality test, save for "a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or
so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent." [28] Lower courts interpreted these guidelines case-by-case,
gradually developing a body of law implementing Feist.[29] These cases suggest that originality requires
some degree of individualized judgment and that alphabetical, geographical, or chronological arrangements
are likely to be considered unoriginal.[30]Feist and its successor cases clearly reopened the question of
copyrightability of pagination and litigation inevitably followed.
D. Oasis
{15} In Oasis Publishing Co. v. West Publishing Co.,[31] a Florida CD-ROM publisher which planned a CD
compilation of Florida cases, challenged West's right to copyright protection in page numbers in the Southern
Reporter. The District Court of Minnesota relied heavily on West Publishing in holding that West's
arrangement of cases was sufficiently original to be protected, that internal pagination was protected as a
corollary to the arrangement, and that star pagination would infringe Wests copyright in the arrangement. The
court rejected Oasis's contention that Feist implicitly overruled West Publishing stating that the West
Publishing court applied "essentially the same" creativity standard applied in Feist.[32] The court specifically
rejected the argument that pagination was a mere system or process not subject to copyright[33] as well as the
argument that a user could as easily replicate West's arrangement from the first page of the citation as from
the internal cites.[34] Like the West Publishing court, the Oasis court focused on anticipated harm to West's
market, averring that replication from the first page cites would not supplant the need for West's products
while replication from the jump cites would do so and, consequently, would constitute infringement.[35] The
case was settled after issuance of the District Court opinions in the Bender cases.[36]
E. The Bender Cases - District Court
{16} In a fact situation nearly identical to that in Oasis, Matthew Bender sought a declaratory judgment that
its use of star pagination to West Reporters on a CD-ROM containing New York case law would not
constitute infringement.[37] It brought its action in the district court for the Southern District of New York,
within the Second Circuit which has developed the most substantial body of law interpreting the post-Feist
originality requirement. Rejecting the "protection-by-reference-to-arrangement" approach, the district court
held that page numbers are mere facts, do not embody any original creation of the compiler and are not
copyrightable.[38]
{17} In a companion case,[39] the New York court reviewed the copyrightability of a different set of
compilation elements. Hyperlaw, Inc., planned to scan West Reporters to obtain the title, text, and certain
other information for a number of United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases.[40] West
contended that its editorial revisions and additions to case text were protected under the "minimum creativity"
standards for compilations. Hyperlaw argued, and the court agreed, that, since Hyperlaw scanned only the
text of individual opinions, the extent of West's copyright in any single opinion must be determined under the
derivative works standard, which requires a substantial, not merely trivial, variation from the base text.[41]
{18} The court found that Hyperlaw's scanning would not affect any elements which represented West's
original creation, such as its arrangement, indices, headnotes, and selection of cases. The court reviewed a
plethora of editorial additions and corrections to text and found that none of them, separately or collectively,
amounted to a distinguishable variation from the opinion as written by the court.[42] West, the court held,
had no protectable interest in any portion of the opinions.[43] West appealed both decisions to the Second
Circuit where a three-judge panel, splitting 2-1, affirmed the District Court holdings.
F. The Bender Cases - Second Circuit.
1. The Pagination Case
{19} In the pagination case, West conceded that its pagination was inserted by an automated computer
program and did not seriously press its claim that pagination, in itself, is sufficiently original to obtain
copyright protection. The court ruled decisively that internal pagination does not possess even a modicum of
creativity and that volume and page numbers are not protected by copyright and may be copied. However,
West resurrected the protection-by-reference-to-arrangement argument with a new technological twist,
alleging that, under the definition of "copies" in 17 U.S.C. ' 101, any work that allows perception of the
arrangement through the aid of a machine creates a copy of the compilation. Since a user could employ
Bender's CD-ROM file-retrieval programs to perceive West's arrangement, West's copyright was infringed.
[44]
{20} The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, West admitted that identification of volume and
first page number of each case was fair use. Since use of these citations already allowed the user to perceive
the arrangement of West's reporters, the only incremental information provided by star pagination to internal
page numbers was the location of page breaks which did not result from any creative activity by West and
could be freely copied. Since fair use pagination already created a lawful copy, star pagination to internal
cites could not create an infringing copy even assuming that West's definition of "copying" was valid. The
court specifically rejected the Oasis court's holding to the contrary.[45]
{21} Second, and more importantly, the court held that, in order for a CD to infringe West's arrangement, the
machine or device that reads it must perceive the embedded material in a substantially similar arrangement. If
the intervention of a third party is required to rearrange the materials into the copyright holder's arrangement,
there can be no infringement by the CD absent some invitation to users to commit infringement.[46] The
court noted that ' 101's definition of "copies" to include machine-readable works was directed only to the
fixation requirement and was meant to define the material objects in which copyrightable and infringing
works may be embedded, not to address questions of arrangement or rearrangement of content.[47]
Nonetheless, the court then engaged in a complete infringement analysis based on West's claims that the CDs
were copies which infringed its arrangement.
{22} Having determined that the relevant arrangement of cases on the plaintiff's CDs was the arrangement in
which the data was physically embedded and perceived by a machine, without user intervention, the court
applied the standard infringement test assessing substantial similarity between the plaintiffs' arrangements
and West's arrangement. Since the fixed arrangement of the plaintiffs' CDs contained many additional cases
and was arranged in a different sequence than West's, there was no direct infringement by the plaintiffs. Only
the intervention of a third party, the user, could create an actionable copy.
{23} The court further rejected West's argument that the CD-ROM manufacturers were guilty of contributory
infringement by making it possible for users to retrieve and print cases in the same arrangement as West's
reporters. West could neither identify any direct infringer, other than its own counsel, nor offer any evidence
that Bender or Hyperlaw encouraged such infringement. Additionally, the CDs clearly were capable of
substantial noninfringing uses which exempted their makers from contributory infringement.[48]
{24} The majority opinion specifically rejected the Eighth Circuit's opinion in West Publishing finding that
"at bottom, West Publishing Co. rested upon the now defunct >sweat of the brow doctrine" and erroneously
protected West's industrious collection rather than its original creation.[49] Judge Sweet, in dissent, argued
that West Publishing, on the contrary, was still good law after Feist and that pagination was an essential part
of the protectable selection and arrangement of the case reporters.[50] 
  
 
2. The Text Case
{25} In the text case, West dropped its claim to copyright in textual corrections of spelling and grammar, but
maintained claims to four other categories of editorial changes: "arrangement" of information specifying the
parties, court and date of decision; "selection and arrangement" of information concerning counsel;
"arrangement of information" to reflect subsequent procedural developments; and "selection" of parallel and
alternate citations to cases cited in the opinions.[51] The first category, notwithstanding the claim's recital of
the word "arrangement," also included capitalization and shortening of case names, restyling of dates, names
of courts, and other word changes. The third and fourth categories included alterations in case text or in
citations to reflect later history.
{26} The court initially addressed conflicting claims by the parties as to whether individual case reports
should be considered as a compilations or derivative works. The court found that case reports contain
elements of both compilations and derivative works, but that the reports need not be characterized as either
for the purposes of its determination. The originality standard for both works is "essentially the same," the
court asserted, notwithstanding that originality for compilations is defined as "a minimal level of creativity"
while the standard for derivative works is a "substantial, not trivial variation" from the original.[52] Since
each of the claimed elements merely added or rearranged preexisting facts, the court found that they were
unprotectable in themselves and could only be protected if West exercised creativity in its selection or
arrangement. The court established a three-part standard for creativity in selection and arrangement based on:
(1) the total number of options available; (2) external factors that limit the viability of certain options and
render others noncreative; and (3) prior uses that render certain selections "garden variety."[53]
{27} Applying that test to the first three categories of West alterations, the court found them to be
standardized, garden variety decisions in which only one to three realistic options were available to West.
West's choices were narrowly limited by industry standards. The parallel citations presented a closer question
but the court concluded that West's decisions concerning citation alterations were inevitable, typical, dictated
by legal convention, or at best binary. The court observed that, if West's citation decisions were
copyrightable, competitors would find it nearly impossible to create a noninfringing, useful case report and
West would obtain an effective monopoly over the commercial publication of case reports containing parallel
citations. Reviewing West's overall decision to make all of the claimed changes, the court found them to
exhibit little creative insight. [54]
{28} Despite its reliance on limited options as a factor in the originality determination, the court specifically
refused to apply merger doctrine per se, stating that the doctrine was only appropriately used in infringement
determinations not determinations of copyrightability. Moreover, West's work did not constitute a "building
block of understanding" to which merger doctrine appropriately applied.[55]
{29} Judge Sweet once again dissented,[56] suggesting that West's decisions are sufficiently original given
that federal judges may not include the same alterations in their opinions. He urged that West's decisions must
be considered in their aggregate, not individually, suggested that Hyperlaw's desire to copy West's reports
indicated originality, and argued that West's selections only seem obvious because of West's success in the
market, that is, because West's system has become the industry standard.[57] Addressing merger doctrine
directly, he suggested that granting West copyright in its additions posed no danger of granting them a
monopoly in the "idea" of publishing judicial opinions. 
  
  
III. The Meaning of Originality
{30} There are several key areas of both opinions which demand closer scrutiny: the court's assertion that
originality standards for compilations and derivative works are identical, its inclusion of "limited options" as
a factor in the originality test, and its treatment of the definition of "copies" under 17 U.S.C. '101.
A. The Text Case
1. The Distinction Between Derivative And Compiled Works
{31} The court would have clearly been correct in concluding that case reporters contain elements of both
compilations and derivative works. Each reporter contains a selection of cases, compiled within a certain
arrangement, as well as substantial materials, such as headnotes, indices and digests, which are derived from
and transform the basic texts. However, the court's conclusion that the editorial alterations of individual case
reports contain elements of both kinds of works is unconvincing. The court relied on the addition of discrete
facts such as attorney's names, parallel citations and later history to support the definition of the report as a
compilation. The other changes made by West, including rearrangement and stylistic editing of prefatory
information, text, and citations are clearly editorial and derivative in nature. However, in common parlance
and in actual practice, all of West's alterations would be considered "editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications" within the clear meaning of the derivative works definition.[58] All of
them build from the basic text of the opinion and have no meaning apart from it. Individual case reports, as
edited by West or anyone else, are correctly classified as derivative works, not compilations, and that
categorization has some consequences for the originality analysis.
{32} The Second Circuit purported that it need not definitively decide whether the case reports are derivative
works or compilations because the originality standard required for copyright is the same for both kinds of
works. Its task was simply to determine whether West's alterations, considered collectively, demonstrated
sufficient originality and creativity to be copyrightable.[59]
{33} However, West, Hyperlaw and the District Court clearly believed that the determination whether case
reports are compilations or derivative works would affect the originality standard. West's claims were
carefully phrased to emphasize that all elements involved arrangement or selection of data, features typical of
compilations, as opposed to editorial revision or correction. It seems likely, in fact, that the claim to copyright
in spelling and grammatical corrections was dropped, not only because it was a clear loser, but in order to
bolster West's claim that case reports are compilations, not derivative works. Wests obvious presumption was
that the "substantial, not trivial variation" requirement for derivative works was at least different in kind, and
probably more stringent, than the minimum creativity standard for compilations.
{34} Certainly both kinds of works must meet a threshold creativity requirement in order to obtain copyright.
The additional matter added or the manner of rearranging or transforming the prior works must constitute
more than a minimal contribution.[60] However, the originality inquiries for the two categories start from
different bases. In the case of compilations, the compiler's originality must inhere in its selection or
arrangement of data or the quality of its added materials. In the case of derivative works, the transformed
product must be compared directly against the underlying work and must represent a sufficiently substantial
variation therefrom to establish minimum creativity. The compilation inquiry is a free form inquiry into
creativity in the context of all prior art; the derivative works inquiry must show minimum creativity but
demands direct comparison with an underlying work which may already contain many of the elements
normally associated with originality. The derivative works comparison is, at least arguably, a tougher test.
Under a derivative works standard, the compiler of case reports must show not only its additions and
alterations to text are minimally creative in the sense that they involve individualized judgments not governed
by rote practices common to the industry, but also that the alterations create nontrivial variations from the
original text of the court's opinion.
{34} Because of its failure to recognize this distinction, the court applied its three-factor test for creativity in
selection and arrangement to every feature claimed by West, regardless of whether the alteration related to
selection or arrangement of data or was a direct revision of existing text. The Second Circuit's conflation of
the two analyses may have been based on an underlying, and probably correct, determination that West's case
reports would not withstand inquiry under either a compilation or derivative works analysis. If case reports
are viewed as compilations, the added data (attorney's names, etc.) are facts, not protectable in themselves,
and their selection and arrangement are, as the court suggests, constrained by "industry practice" in the legal
profession to a very small number of options. If reports are viewed as derivative works, West's edited reports
retain those faults and, additionally, vary in only minor ways from the underlying public domain texts. As the
court notes, "faithfulness to the public-domain original is the dominant editorial value, so that the creative is
the enemy of the true."[61]
{35} The court's avoidance of the categorization issue and imposition of the same standard to both
compilations and derivative works, while convenient in the case at hand, obscures differences in the
originality analyses for the works which may create difficulties if applied to works other than case reports.
Similarly, its formulation of the three-part test for creativity, though producing a laudable result in this case,
seems to surreptitiously import elements of merger doctrine into the copyrightability determination, without
directly addressing the usual issues of merger analysis.
2. Originality and Merger
{36} Merger doctrine is a collateral branch of the idea/expression dichotomy which informs the entire body
of copyright law. Ideas belong to the public domain from which all authors may freely draw the building
blocks for their creative works. Copyright protects only the individualized expression of the idea. Merger
doctrine precludes copyright protection for some expressions of ideas if the idea behind the expression is
such that it can be expressed only in one way or in a very limited number of ways. The doctrine prevents an
author from monopolizing an idea by copyrighting a few expressions of it.[62] Courts vary in their treatment
of merger doctrine as either a threshold bar to copyright protection or simply a defense to the charge of
infringement on grounds of substantial similarity. Nimmer asserts that the latter is the better view because it
evaluates separability of idea from expression in particular factual contexts, rather than per se.[63]
{37} In the text case, Hyperlaw urged that the court apply merger doctrine to bar copyrightability of West's
revisions to opinions. The court specifically declined to do so on the grounds that the Second Circuit
considers merger doctrine only in the context of the infringement analysis. Under that approach, a defendant
who copied the plaintiff's work would not be allowed to rely on merger to avoid liability. Since Hyperlaw
sought to copy West's case reports, it could not take advantage of the merger doctrine. Moreover, West's
opinions were not a "building block" of understanding which was the type of expression to which merger
doctrine applies.[64]
{38} However, the court nonetheless incorporated a merger-like analysis into its originality test by defining
creativity in selection and arrangement as, in large part, a function of the total number of options available
and external factors limiting the viability of certain options. It asserted that "selection from among two or
three options, or of options that have been selected countless times before and have become typical, is
insufficient. Protection of such choices would enable a copyright holder to monopolize widely used
expression and upset the balance of copyright law."[65] While the court refers to monopolization of
expression, rather than idea, its rationale incorporates the guiding principle of merger doctrine without
troubling the court with the attendant, often painful, necessity of defining the particular idea which may have
merged with the expression.[66]
{39} In practical effect, the number of options available will always be influenced by external factors limiting
the viability of certain options so that the first two factors in the court's originality analysis tend to merge with
one another to establish the scope of permissible variations. The analysis is reminiscent of the analysis in
software cases, an area of law in which merger doctrine has become particularly important, because options
for expression are limited by industry standards and interoperability requirements.[67] The court may have
formulated a merger-like originality standard which will deny protection in any industry in which
standardization is a dominant factor and creativity "can only proceed in a narrow groove."[68] The
unanswered question, presumably to be determined on a case-by-case basis, is the precise number of options
beyond which choices may rise to the level of creativity. Three options are not enough, but are four or five
sufficient? If the four or five options are widely used, does the prior use prong of the test preclude originality
notwithstanding the wider selection of choices?
{40} In this particular case, the court's originality analysis renders the same result which might be anticipated
under a more straightforward application of merger doctrine to the issue of copyrightability. Judge Sweet's
dissenting approach, which weighs the likelihood of monopolization of the "idea" of publishing judicial
opinions, is at least direct, though his definition of the idea may be overly broad. While the complexities of
merger analysis are well beyond the scope of this comment, some clarification of the Circuit's approach to
merger doctrine in the context of determinations of copyrightability would seem to be in order.
B. The pagination case: Losing the Focus on Originality
{41} In the pagination case, the court's focus shifted from the individual case report to the reporter volume as
a whole. The court's position that pagination, in itself, is not remotely original enough to support copyright,
now seems to represent the universal consensus. This position supported the second step in the court's logic,
that inclusion of star pagination to internal page breaks did not impact protected material. With the
copyrightability of pagination per se disposed of, the logical third step in the analysis of West's claims should
have been a determination of the copyrightability of West's reporter arrangement. However, the court
eschewed Hyperlaw's invitation to assess whether West's arrangement was, in fact, original enough to be
copyrighted.[69] Instead, it assumed copyrightability for purposes of the argument and turned directly to an
infringement analysis, evaluating West's argument that a work which allows the perception of a protectable
element of a compilation through the aid of a machine amounts to an actionable copy of the compilation.
Following West down a path best left untravelled, the Court engaged in successive rounds of analysis of
"copying," infringement and substantial similarity, wading hip deep into murky waters which its opinion does
nothing to clarify.
{42} The courts have rarely distinguished themselves in their efforts to define the word "copies" in response
to new technologies. In White Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,[70] the Supreme Court held that piano
rolls for player pianos were not "copies" of the musical compositions whose performance they enabled,
because they did not mimic the format of a printed sheet of music and were not intelligible to the human eye.
That limited definition was intentionally quashed by Congress when it enacted the 1976 Copyright Act,
defining copies to include any material object "in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device."[71] The definition expanded the fixation requirement to
include new technologies like CD-ROMs or computer hard drives.
{43} Faced with the implications of computer technology, the Ninth Circuit subsequently went so far as to
define actionable "copying" to include downloading of data into random access memory.[72] While its
position is heartily endorsed by content providers and has now been endorsed by some other circuits,[73] but
the court failed to appreciate that virtually any use of a computer entails such "copying" and thereby made
potential infringers of almost everyone who "boots up" a computer and explores the World Wide Web. Now
the Second Circuit adds yet another gloss which inserts machine capabilities into the infringement analysis in
a way probably unanticipated by Congress.
{44} As the court itself notes, the sole purpose of ' 101's definition of "copies" is to explicate the fixation
requirement.[74] The legislative addition of the language concerning perception with the aid of a machine
was meant to insure that reproductions in machine-readable media would meet the fixation requirement for
copyrightability.[75] Congress' intention was to ensure media-neutrality, making the law flexible enough to
adapt to new technologies. Standards for infringement parallel the standards for copyright protection, but it
may be questioned whether the Aperception by machine language@ of the definition of "copy" ought to be so
directly injected into an infringement analysis as to govern what constitutes an infringing arrangement.
{45} The court avoids the potential consequences of its definition, in this case, by virtue of the fact that the
CDs in question contained additional data in arrangements quite different from West's. The disks could only
be made to mimic West's arrangement though the active intervention of a user electronically "cutting and
pasting" a copy, a task which the court recognizes to be "thankless toil" extremely unlikely to occur.[76]
However, the court's statement of the appropriate scope of infringement analysis indicates that a CD which
could be directly read by a device which renders a protected arrangement perceptible without user
intervention would infringe on West's arrangement. If, for example, a third party competitor provided a
search and retrieval device which automatically allowed Matthew Bender's disks to be read in West order,
would Matthew Bender then become a contributory infringer merely by proffering a CD which could be so
read? Would the third party also be a contributory infringer? What if the device's ability to read West's
arrangement were entirely incidental to other capabilities with substantial noninfringing uses?
{46} The court's clear identification of direct and contributory infringers and its acknowledgment of the
complete dearth of evidence of any direct infringement are welcome, but the court should have avoided this
line of analysis altogether. White-Smith illustrated the dangers of tying the definition of a "copy" to an
infringement analysis involving a particular technology in a particular fact situation. Congress intentionally
drafted the definition of "copies" to avoid technology-specific readings of the statute and achieve media
neutrality. However, the Second Circuit has now made specific technological capabilities the central focus of
the definition, at least for infringement purposes. Moreover, the mere formulation of the scenario in the
preceding paragraph clearly begs the response "Why would anyone trouble to create a device which emulates
Wests arrangement?"
{47} The plain fact of the matter is that West's arrangement as such is entirely irrelevant in the electronic
context. No user of electronic products is interested in employing West's arrangement, much less copying it.
If West were to rearrange its reporters into strictly chronological order, users of electronic research
technologies would care little as long as practitioners could correlate opinion text with page numbers for
purposes of citation. The valuable element of West's print compilations, which it has sought to protect
through increasingly convoluted legal arguments in seemingly endless rounds of litigation, is simply its
pagination, those electronically-generated Arabic numerals which even the West Publishing court could not
find original in their own right.
{48} Even if that were not the case, it is clear, following Feist, that West's arrangement is itself insufficiently
original to support copyright. West's system for case reporters consists of separations by geographic region,
jurisdiction, and court with a largely chronological internal structure. In light of post-Feist holdings
discounting originality in geographic and chronological arrangements, its arrangements are as commonplace
as the garden-variety, alphabetic arrangement of the Feist directory.[77] Rather than elaborating on the
copying and infringement issues in order to avoid the originality question, the Second Circuit should have
addressed the originality claim head on. Originality, not copying, has been at the center of the controversy
since Feist and it would certainly have made more sense for the court to determine whether West's
arrangement was protected by copyright at all before tackling the inherently more complex questions of
copying and infringement. Had it done so, the court might have contributed to a final denouement for the
pagination tale, instead of merely setting the stage for the next episode. 
  
  
IV. Conclusion
{49} While the results reached in the Bender cases are consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in Feist,
the court's treatment of the originality standard for compilations begs for clarification. West's request for
rehearing en banc was denied, but a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court is expected.[78] The
Supreme Court ought to take the opportunity to resolve the dispute between the Second and Eighth Circuits
and clarify the appropriate interpretation of the originality standard as applied to case reporters and other
legal compilations. The correct interpretation should exclude pagination and editorial corrections from the
scope of copyright protection and lay to rest West's claims to protection through reference to an arrangement
which is itself unoriginal. It should not entangle the courts unnecessarily in debates over the definition of
"copies" in the electronic age, particularly when those arguments are raised to protect stakeholders in fading
technologies at the expense of market competition in new technologies.
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